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Pragmatic E-Pistols
Eugene Halton
Pistolets are the best Artillerie. 
And they who write to Lords, rewards to get, Are




1 Dear William, 
2 I am a student of pragmatism, and I must begin with an apology. For some time I did not
take your writing as seriously as I should have, probably because of your conception of
pragmatism. I am still of the opinion that you misunderstood Peirce, that what you took
to  be  obscurity  on his  part  was,  in  fact,  his  carefulness  in  his  choice  of  words  and
delimitation of ideas. Peirce, as you know, considered himself a “laboratory philosopher,”
and he forged a far-reaching conception of science at odds, in many ways, with the very
fabric of modern thought. It is interesting to me how each of you developed philosophies
of purport, not only in pragmatism, but in your conceptions of science and of its place in
society as well. 
3 A  Nobel  Prize  winner,  Jacque  Monod,  exemplified  the  extreme  opposite  position
concerning science, perhaps, when he claimed that, “The cornerstone of the scientific
method is…the systematic denial that ‘true’ knowledge can be reached by interpreting
phenomena in terms of final causes – that is to say, of ‘purpose’ […] The ancient covenant
is in pieces: man at last knows that he is alone in the unfeeling immensity of the universe,
out of which he emerged by chance” (1974: 30, 167). And Bertrand Russell, in his 1946
book History of Western Philosophy, says, “In the welter of conflicting fanaticisms, one of
the few unifying forces is scientific truthfulness, by which I mean the habit of basing our
beliefs upon observations and inferences as impersonal, and as much divested of local and
temperamental bias, as is possible for human beings […] The habit of careful veracity
acquired in the practice  of  this  philosophical  method can be extended to  the whole
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sphere of human activity, producing, wherever it exists, a lessening of fanaticism with an
increasing capacity of sympathy and mutual understanding. In abandoning a part of its
dogmatic pretensions, philosophy does not cease to suggest and inspire a way of life”
(1946: 744).
4 Ah,  the age of  enlightened modernism,  when intellect  thought  that  its  “impersonal”
scientific rationale would inspire a way of life with increased “sympathy and mutual
understanding” to “the whole sphere of human activity,” instead of dehumanization. It
thought that by removing the personal, the local, the temperamental, you could remove
the fanatical.  It  did not understand that it  was simply removing some of the human
anchors of sanity, so as to make it easier for fanaticism to re-emerge, disguised in the
clothing of cold, truth seeking hyper-rationality: truth seeking in means, indifferent as to
ends: call me Ahab, as Melville put it, “all my means are sane, my motive and my object
mad.”
5 Russell published his words the year after World War 2 ended, the year after science
developed the first atomic bombs that were used by the United States to kill hundreds of
thousands of Japanese, dropped on them from heavenly heights. His book was published
by George Allen and Unwin in London, a city that had been rained on by German V-2
rockets, compliments of rocket science. 
6 How vastly different Russell’s words were from yours, when you said, “The only form of
thing that we directly encounter, the only experience that we concretely have, is our own
personal life […] And this systematic denial on science’s part of personality as a condition
of events, this rigorous belief that in its own essential and innermost nature our world is
a strictly impersonal world, may, conceivably, as the whirligig of time goes round, prove
to be the very defect that our descendants will be most surprised at in our own boasted
science, the omission that to their eyes will most tend to make it look perspectiveless and
short” (1986: 166). 
7 Times’ whirligig has gone around, William, to prove your words and disprove Russell’s.
Now admittedly, you don’t give as much critical thought in your work to the place of
institutions in the operating of society as might be called for. But your words here offer a
profound critique of modern science and technology. The extension “to the whole sphere
of human activity” of an impersonal intelligence, as Russell would have it, has not proved
to be the mark of science proper,  but of  science in the thrall  of  the depersonalizing
machine. That is why I find your allowance for the person and for the qualities of life in
your account of science and society to be of such value, and why I seek to reconcile them
with Peirce’s philosophy of science. Peirce did see that science is not sufficient for the
practice  of  life  because it  does  not  go deeply enough to the whole passionate being
required for the practice of life. It is why he reserved science for theoretical life, and why,
in his “Vitally Important Questions” lectures of 1898, he disdained science in the service
of  practical  questions.  This  is  also  why  he  noted  the  difference  in  the  meanings  of
“pragmatic”  and  “practical,”  and  why  his  pragmatism  is  not,  as  he  put  it,  a
“practicalism,” whereas yours is. 
8 As you put it in Pragmatism: “The whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out
what definite difference it will make to you and me, at definite instants of our life, if this
world-formula or that world-formula be the true one” (James, 1977: 379). Though it is
true that practical decisions often need to be based on beliefs and “gut” feelings which
produce the “definite difference” you mention, Peirce’s claim is that theoretical life can
only  be  based  on  fallible  opinions,  always  subject  to  correction  within  the  unlimited
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community of inquiry. So pragmatic meaning is found, as he put it elsewhere, “not in a
particular experiment, but in experimental phenomena,” (Peirce 1938: Vol. 5 Para. 425).1 In
my opinion Peirce got that one right, and your version of pragmatism does not. But I do
think that you are addressing the relation of ideas to practical life, which has been a
source of great misunderstanding in the modern era. George Bernard Shaw put it this way
in his 1930 toast to Albert Einstein: “Science is always wrong. It never solves a problem
without creating 10 more.” Now he may have been hyperbolizing, because science clearly
gets so many things right. But he points to something that can be taken positively as how
scientific findings generate new inquiries, or negatively, of how a precise answer to a
particular problem may be wrongly generalized in practical life to produce a hydra-head
of unanticipated consequences worse than the original problem. 
9 It  was  through a  scholar  named Lewis  Mumford  that  I  first  came across  your  term
“vicious intellectualism,” a term that has been close to my heart for many years. In my
experience many academic intellectuals (that subspecies of intellectuals with the “three
magic letters,” Ph.D., as you put it in your essay “The Ph.D. Octopus”) do not take the
“life” part of intellectual life seriously, and their intellectual prowess was gained at the
cost of infantilized emotions. It probably was their way of surviving childhood. The effect
is to put powerful brains at the service of infantilized emotions, and institutionally this is
how  bureaucracy  is  spelled.  It  is  the  infant  enwrapped  in  modern  rationalization:
cognitive facilities hyper-developed, emotional and empathic abilities diminished or even
disabled as a virtual system requirement. To me intellect is that discriminating (meaning
“to choose between”) aspect of intelligence, capable of determining purport, which is
only one kind of intelligence. There is also the more Russian term “intelligentsia,” which
has a broader connotation, inclusive of the arts as well as the critical capacities. But that
sense  almost  seems  to  be  a  target  for  vicious  intellectuals,  who  want  their  world
pigeonholed. 
10 A  more  primary,  yet  sorely  neglected,  intelligence  is  what  I’d  call  “bodying  forth”
intelligence,  creatively  conceiving,  or  perhaps  what  William  Blake  meant  by  Poetic
Imagination. These facets of spontaneous, live to the moment intelligence don’t seem to
figure into the social sciences that much these days, even in, if you could imagine it, the
study of art. But you put it so well when you said, “Our intelligence cannot wall itself up
alive, like a pupa in its chrysalis. It must at any cost keep on speaking terms with the
universe that engendered it” (James 1977a: 556). Here, it seems to me, you are of a piece
with Peirce’s semiotic realism. Being on speaking terms with the engendering universe
may very well entail an engendering consciousness alive in awareness to the moment,
creatively attuning to what you called, as I first heard from philosopher Bruce Wilshire,
the “much-at-once,” rather than habitually calculating.
11 You know, William, I’ve always felt  that you and your brother Henry were somehow
crossed in your cradles; that you were really the artist-writer on the inside, while Henry
was the psychologist. I realize I may just be talking to myself, but in my inner life I admire
your palpable presence in your writing, just as I admire Peirce’s perspicacity, and hope to
catch a little of each in what I write.
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To George Herbert Mead
14 Dear George, 
15 In your 1925 essay on “The Genesis of the Self and Social Control” you say: “But it is not
necessary that we should talk to another to have these ideas. We can talk to ourselves,
and this we do in the inner forum of what we call thought. We are in possession of selves
just insofar as we can and do take the attitudes of others toward ourselves and respond to
those attitudes […] Our thinking is an inner conversation in which we may be taking the
roles of specific acquaintances over against ourselves, but usually it is with what I have
termed the ‘generalized other’ that we converse” (1925: 272). I wish to put those words to
work in this letter to you. 
16 First, I have some good news and some bad news. The good news is that you have been
accepted into  the  sociological  canon;  your  work has  become part  of  the  sociological
liturgy, so to speak, with obligatory genuflections. Ironically, your work as a pragmatist
philosopher  has  been  largely  ignored  by  philosophers,  who  seldom  include  you  in
discussions of pragmatists, despite a revival of interest in pragmatism since the 1960s.
Dewey has  come back big,  but  you,  despite  the  affinity  of  many of  your  ideas  with
Dewey’s, remain curiously peripheral to professional academic philosophers. Go figure!
17 One of the ways your work on mind, self and society remains relevant to social science
today is that it is able to include the subjective elements of experience, without resorting
to dualism of individual versus social, and to frame this in the context of a democratic
philosophy. I  find this both in yours and Dewey’s social  psychologies and theories of
democracy. 
18 Democracy does not begin in subjectivity; it begins in a common life. It, like chickens and
eggs,  does  not  start  with  isolate  individuals  who  discover  the  common,  but  in  the
common life through which individuals arise, as you showed particularly well in your
essay. There you state: “[…] we realize that each individual has a world that differs in
some degree from that of any other member of the same community, that he slices the
events of the community life that are common to all from a different angle from that of
any other individual […] It is this recognition that takes psychology out of its isolation, as
a science that deals with what is found in the mind of an individual, and makes of it the
standpoint from which to approach reality as it is going on” (1925: 260). 
19 Subjectivity  is  an element  of  a  common life,  from a democratic  perspective.  Human
subjectivity is primordially an internalization of community, arising in early biocultural
socialization developmentally, as you showed in your discussions of the play stage leading
to the “game,” but already primed for development in the human genome and individual
temperament, as more recent research has confirmed. 
20 Or consider this: the subject arises in relation to the rise of objects, developmentally. The
child’s discovery of a world of objects, of others, is a developmental process in which the
subject is discovered as well; in effect, is extricated from the process. “It is and I am” is no
given,  but  a  developmental  achievement.  It  is  a  biosocial  construction involving  the
internalization of a community of animate objects, some of which are human. Not only is
the  subject  social,  but  the  objective  object  is  also  social.  It  may  have  its  individual
existence as well, but its reality is intrinsically social, as an element of the interpretive
act, of communicative conduct, of semiosis. 
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21 Your  developmental  view of  the  self  remains  interesting  to  consider  in  the  light  of
theories  of  social  constructionism,  which  claim  selves  and  societies  are  solely
conventional  constructions.  Kenneth  Gergen  is  a  psychologist  who  has  argued  for  a
postmodern view of the self as “relational,” as simply constructed by the conventions of
the culture. His view illustrates the anaemic understanding of signs prevalent today as
limited  to  conventional  signification,  incapable  of  allowing  more  modalities  of
signification,  for  example,  your  discussion  of  what  Wundt  originally  termed,  “the
conversation of gestures,” as prelinguistic, preconventional signification. 
22 These ideas of social constructionism derive from older traditions. Earlier Georg Simmel,
for example, was working out of the Kantian tradition, making the distinction of form and
content, and with an idea that sociology is the study of forms of interaction. His sociology
is formal, studying forms, not contents, of interaction. Kant’s outlook was that the human
faculty  of  knowing gives  form to  the  otherwise  formless  content  of  the  manifold  of
experience. One can read this as the mind gives form to experience, or constructs the
world. Kant’s nominalist outlook entails a divide between form and content, nature and
culture, world and mind. You and the other pragmatists rejected that way of dividing
things. 
23 Even earlier,  Hobbes took philosophical  nominalism into political  and social  thought,
reversing Aristotle by claiming an individualistic “state of nature,” “[…] a condition of
Warre of every one against every one,” which required a social contract for there to be
society. This view of the social as conventional and as divorced from nature entails a view
that society is a non-natural construction. You and the other pragmatists rejected this
way of dividing things as well, seeking a philosophical continuity of nature and culture.
Peirce’s semiotic maps out a range of signs beyond simply conventional, as does your
discussion of the development of the self. 
24 Once  you  admit  natural  signification  as  more  encompassing  than  conventional
signification,  though still  admitting the wide range of  conventional  signification,  you
open up possibilities that yes, there are social constructions that can be arbitrary, but
that there can also be social constructions that may be the result of natural constructions
as well. The very earliest socialization of the infant with its mother/caretaker involves
wired-in behaviors of attunement by the infant deriving from its subcortical brain, which
are read as intelligible signs by the mother/caretaker,  which furthers the socializing
attunement and dance between them, which in turn furthers later cortical development
and interaction by the infant. The result is a social construction of the self, but one in
which natural constructing signification is a key element. This process is unavailable to
the Hobbesian, Kantian, and contemporary arbitrary social constructionist outlooks, as
well as to those of pure biological reductionisms, which deny the place of communicative
socialization, but can be easily understood by Peirce’s and your perspectives. 
25 That newborn infant’s facial attunement to its mother, deriving from the limbic system of
its subcortical brain, is a good example of how “conversation of gestures” can occur in
significant  human  transactions.  Through  the  mother’s  mimicking  responses  of
attunement, the pair can “dance” the infant into cortical interaction, developing later,
through gestural play, into the development of the significant symbol, where child learns
to  indicate  to  self  and  other  simultaneously,  through  internal  dialogue  with  the
generalized other.
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26 Mirror neurons, an area of brain cells discovered in the premotor cortex of macaque
monkeys in 1996, suggest a physiological basis for a “looking-glass” self along the lines of
Cooley and your and Peirce’s discussions. They fire not only when the monkey performs
an action, but also when the monkey observes the same action performed by another:
monkey see, monkey do. And more, they also reflect the sensations and emotions of the
other.  They  form  a  neural  basis  of  mind-reading,  and  evidence  suggests  a  relation
between deficits in mirror neurons and autism. I find it interesting that the technical
discovery of the physiology has received so much attention, while your theory of how
becoming  a  self  through developing  a  generalized  other  as  a  basis  for  thought  and
conduct illustrated back then what is  simply being confirmed today.  In other words,
mirror neurons provide a physiological confirmation of your theory, rather than being a
wholly new idea.
27 Back  in  your  time  Freud  thought  that  psychoanalysis  would  eventually  give  way  to
neurology. Today, many cognitive scientists similarly think psychological and sociological
phenomena will  give way to neuroscience.  But  it  might  come out  happier  than that
dismal form of reductionism: social theories of mind and of empathic social relation such
as yours, Cooley’s and Peirce’s can suggest ways for cognitive science to emerge from its
“black box” model of isolate brain, while simultaneously being informed by its findings.
The body-mind is  a  biosocial  reality,  not  reducible to the machine model  which has
dominated modern neuroscience. The machine model can be useful, but it is partial, and
cannot encompass spontaneous, generative minding. 
28 The reality of a self  is not its existence, but its intelligibility as a sign. Signs involve
existence, but are not reducible to existence, for their being lies in their being interpreted
in a future interpretation; in continuing semeiosis. So that a self or a sign has a reality at
any given moment as a potential existence, in Peirce’s terms.
29 Modern  materialism  would  consider  all  of  this  reducible  to  actual  existence.  Peirce
claimed that such a nominalist way of thinking, shaving off generality in the name of
Occam’s razor, actually cuts its own throat and ultimately renders science inexplicable.
What if the modern era and its earnest scientists have been working for the myth of the
machine, projecting the subjective clockwork culture of their time onto the objective
universe, truly discovering with the precision of William Blake’s painting of Newton, the
truth of the single‑visioned part, while sacrificing the vision of the whole reality? Blake’s
Newton,  supple  but  hunched  over  his  compass,  blindered  to  his  surrounds,  is  a
visualization of the paradox of accurate viewing of the part and blindness to the whole.
To put this in Peircean terms, modern science is corrupt in its nominalism, treating the
reality of generals, which are the basis of its life, as unreal. 
30 This brings me to another point. While your concept of the generalized other remains a
fruitful way to understand the development of the self, it seems to me time to update it.
You pictured a democratic model of the generalized other. Yet the modern world picture
has been dominated by the machine, by the universe as a giant clock, and more recently
the brain as a computer. These are not simply empty metaphors, but living symbols of the
myth of our time, namely, that ultimately reality is a kind of machine, and we but parts of
it. The mythic element in this is the idealization of the machine as defining nature, of the
automatic,  and  the  simultaneous  denigration  of  the  spontaneous.  And  George,  the
machine  model  is  not  democratic,  quite  the  opposite.  It  is  an  alienation  of  human
purport, of the automatic portions of purport expansively projected out (ironically, in the
name of anti-teleological and even anti-mythical) as virtual deity substitute. Today that
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imago has come to dominance in the diffusion of technology and its colonization of the
self through a plethora of devices. 
31 And so I have termed this pervasive model that gets into the socialization process the
mechanical other. It is meant to draw attention to how the modern world picture, far from
being anti-teleological,  has  as  its  purpose the colonization and replacement  of  those
supreme gifts of our organic, sensing and signifying nature by dictates of the automaton.
As I argued in my book, The Great Brain Suck, it is not so much a process of brain-washing
as soft brain-rinsing through pleasurable distractions. I also introduced a new term to
add to  Cooley’s  primary and secondary relations,  which I  call  “tertiary relations.”  If
primary  is  face-to-face,  and  secondary  is  person  to  role,  tertiary  is  person-machine
mediated relations. When tertiary relations predominate social relations, to the point of
displacing primary and even secondary relations, the generalized other manifests as the
mechanical other, role model for developing the automaton within, a compliant servant
of the power system. Your idea of the generalized other as the internalized community
rooted in democratic ideals provides an alternative. 
32 In my view it may be precisely the deep-rooted organic abilities for what I term self-
originated experience that can ultimately offset a culture of automatism. But this has led
me to further modification of your idea of the generalized other, namely, a consideration
of the possible genesis of the generalized other. Your view treats the human socializing
agents: parents, playmates, both imaginary and actual, and broader human community. I
think  the  original  generalized  other  went  further;  that  it  was  primarily  wild,  and
significantly non-human. 
33 Dramatic and ritual-like processes percolate deep from our bio-semiotic nature, including
the subcortical brain. One might say that semiosis was the primary “tool” that begat
humans, not the reverse, in the two million year trajectory toward the emergence of
symbolic signification. We emerged through an environment alive with signs, ranging
from mother and clan to the non-human others to whom we paid the closest attention. It
was by attuning to the others without and within, including the non-human wild others,
that  we found ourselves.  Your  developmental  theory,  like  most  other  developmental
accounts,  seems to me hampered by anthropocentrism in this regard,  in limiting the
evolution of the socializing process to human participants and excluding the profound
significance of the revered community of life. They were the actual wild others as well as
imagined others in play and ritual who coaxed us into the significant symbol. They were
what were on our emergent minds as we painted them on the walls of the caves tens of
thousands of years ago. 
34 It was especially through the animal others, the original others of the mind’s I, as Paul
Shepard pointed out, that we emerged as the degenerate monkeys we are (if you will
excuse  my  Peirce-onification  of  homo  sapiens  sapiens).  Peirce  coined  the  term
“degenerate monkey” by way of alluding to human prolonged neoteny, new-born like
characteristics.  We  are  biologically  determined  to  our  peculiar  human  ways  of
signification, involving prolonged neoteny, the loosening up of instinctive determination
coevolving with greater communicative and cooperative social signification. 
35 Proto-human  ritual  “conversations  of  gestures”  became  self-aware  ritualizing
communications, and these were the most basic tools through which we bootstrapped
ourselves into humankind, of far greater significance than stone tools. That is why drama
must be compelling to be convincing, something more than simply “dramatic effect” or
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social construction: it retains the full play of our organic, gesturing complexus of signs,
natured and nurtured over hundreds of millennia. 
36 Perhaps the first person, the first avatar of the symbol, was the wild other, impersonated.
Impersonation  goes  far  deeper  than  simply  wearing  a  mask  (persona).  The  self  as
persona/mask suggests spectator consciousness rather than participation consciousness,
and a  separation of  the  enactor  from the  enacted.  That  is  indeed what  occurred in
civilization in the emergence of theater from ritual.  But the human person originally
emerged as participant in the social, transformative ritual drama of what Paul Shepard
called “the sacred game,”with a play on game as play, and on prey and predator relation.
The human person emerged from transformative transactions with the signifying beings
in the evolutionary drama of life and death. Those transactions made for good eating,
good inferencing, good ways for thinking the world and revering it (Shepard 1998).
37 As Peirce put it: “Something of the general nature of personality there is in all general
ideas. These conceptions are in a certain sense creations of the human intelligence, but in
another aspect the human mind is the creation of these conceptions working together.
These general conceptions are no figments, they are real things – more than that, they
are living beings with something like life and something like personality. Mind acts upon
mind by virtue of its continuity; and this continuity involves generality” (MS 954). And in
this sense the generality being internalized from habitat significations eventually became
incorporated as the capability for the generalized other that constitutes the significant
symbol in your sense. And this is why I think it was originally predominantly wild. In
impersonating the wild other,  ingesting its character and gestures as we ingested its
body, we incorporated the intelligence of the ecological mind as the inner vocabulary of
the human self: ways of hunting, tracking, ways of camouflage and moving, ways of being.
Our  minds  were  created  in  the  creaturing  of  our  minds  by  the  wild  others  we
encountered. 
38 So far as we told ourselves what we learned from the instinctive genius of the animals and
plants,  revering  them,  we  found  the  ways  to  mature  our  dematured,  “degenerate
monkey,”  selves.  But  when,  walled  off  in  human-centered  cities,  we  began  to  tell
ourselves what we learned from ourselves, revering our projections of ourselves as gods,
we began that well-known tale, told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.
The tall tale of the degenerate monkey: the mask of Civilization and its fruits of increased
social inequality, work load, poorer nutrition, famine, mass killing warfare, and other
niceties  not  usually  included  in  describing  what  it  means  to  be  “civilized.”  De-
animalization  of  human  consciousness  by  anthropocentrism  coincided  with  the
beginnings of dehumanization (Halton 2007). 
39 Considered in the context of Peirce’s discussions of instinctive genius, those signs of life
to which traditional foraging humans interpretively attune, attune us to the instinctive
genius of ecological mind. That attunement is not only requisite for dematured primates
with  prolonged  neoteny,  namely,  we  degenerate  monkeys,  but  is  also  the  genius  of
panzooism (a term I’ve borrowed from John Stuart Stuart-Glennie, adding my own
context), the emergent worldview of practical and reverential attunement to life, which
bodied us forth into our human body-minds. 
40 In that same essay of yours on “The Genesis of the Self and Social Control,” you also said
something rather  unfortunate:  “I  can only  refer  to  the  bearing of  this  childish  play
attitude upon so-called sympathetic magic. Primitive men call out in their own activity
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some simulacrum of the response which they are seeking from the world about. They are
children crying in the night” (269-70).
41 I’m  sorry  to  say  that  your  progressivism  prevented  you  from  fully  considering  the
intelligence of  ecological  mind as  that  primarily  addressed in “so-called sympathetic
magic” by so-called “primitive men.” When one addresses,  through mimesis,  through
ritualizing dance or song or story, the wild generalized other that is the ecological mind,
there is real intelligence deriving from habitat in the dialogue, however fantastically the
dialogue be clothed. Not that there is not also human projection that occurs as well, as a
monologue functioning as a simulacrum of dialogue. But there is also valuable practical
significance to ruminating over the conduct of creatures one may be hunting tomorrow,
for example, or dancing them as a way into their movements, gestures and minds.
42 Such conversations of gestures, through ritual, engaged our ancestors into humankind
over the course of evolution. Yet at a certain point, we distanced ourselves from the wild
others through domestication, to our great loss in the long run. Dematured primates such
as  ourselves  may  require  matured  wild  others  as  “role  models,”  something  the  full
instinctive intelligence of wild others could provide, but the dematured intelligence of
domesticates we surrounded ourselves with in agricultural civilization could not. We gave
it up at our peril. As Ralph Waldo Emerson told it: “The end of the human race will be that
it will eventually die of civilization.”
43 Speaking of wild, I heard that you and Sergei Prokoviev had to escape a police raid on a
card game you both were involved in when he was in Chicago for the premiere of his
opera, “Love of Three Oranges.” Is that true? 




46 Dear John, 
47 I am writing as someone who has drawn from a number of your ideas, and who remains
appreciative of them, yet harbors misgivings about your larger view of things. In my
opinion you remain a vital source of ideas for social science today, and so I would like to
review some reasons why I think so and then go on to criticize your larger perspective as
insufficient to comprehend the devitalizing forces at large today.
48 One aspect of your philosophy that remains underappreciated is the aesthetic theory you
developed in your 1934 book Art as Experience. There you finally fleshed out your idea of
the consummatory phase of conduct, as well as the place of qualitative, felt experience
you had elaborated earlier in Experience and Nature. You silenced some of the critics of
your instrumentalism who argued that it was a mere utilitarian conception of conduct by
describing aesthetic experience as the consummation of the act, in which the qualitative
aspect of the act itself, rather than the act as a means to an end, is prominent. Any given
act of interpretation may have both elements simultaneously. 
49 You showed how aesthetic experience is neither simply subjective nor objective, but is
the pervasive quality of the act, felt or “had” rather than known by the experiencer.
Having an aesthetic experience is far more general than experiencing art: all experience
potentially involves an aesthetic element or perspective.  But this  does not mean,  as,
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composer John Cage would say,  that all  experience is  art.  One can have an aesthetic
experience of chance sounds without that being an aesthetic experience of music, contra
Cage. In my own study of The Meaning of Things (1981), the objects respondents described
most often as holding aesthetic meanings were houseplants, not art, because the qualities
of the plants themselves most often evoked their meaning, rather than indirect social
meanings, such as “it was a wedding present” or “we got it on vacation,” which many art
objects signified. 
50 Your distinction brings out what to me seems one of the strengths of pragmatism: a full-
bodied theory of meaning that not only accounts for conventional signification, but is
able to encompass qualitative, experiential, and even symbolic modalities of signification
that are extraconventional. Your qualitative element of signification and Peirce’s iconic
sign allow the sign a presence, unlike the French semiological tradition of meaning as
differential, where a sign’s meaning is determined by its difference from other signs in
the system. 
51 Contemporary social  science has  been flooded with social  constructionist  theories  of
meaning,  which  hold  that  meaning  is  an  arbitrary  or conventional  system.  In  more
extreme forms in postmodernism, meaning is regarded as purely conventional, and the
place  of  experience  and  nature,  of  qualitative  and  indexical  modalities  of  signs,  of
biosocial aspects of self and society, of signs capable of real purport, of reality itself, are
all denied. A self proclaimed Deweyan pragmatist by the name of Richard Rorty held such
views, leading me to proclaim him a fragmatist rather than a pragmatist (Halton 1995).
One of the ironies in the radical postmodern ideologies is that in the name of a kind of
“everything  is  permitted”  perspective,  signification  and  interpretation  are  tightly
constricted to the realm of the conventional or contingent. For such reasons I view it as
an embodiment of contemporary techno-consumptive capitalism, rather, as many of its
adherents seem to believe, an alternative.
52 One  of  the  key  elements  of  your  aesthetic  theory  that  I  have  found  insightful  in
understanding  conduct  is  your  distinction  between  perception and  recognition.
Recognition, in your sense, uses already internalized, habitualized schema to interpret,
whereas perception goes further to bring those schema to meet the felt situation, so that
the  interpretation  is  influenced  by  the  qualities  of  the  situation  –  or  work  –  being
interpreted,  and so  that  the schemas of  interpretation one brings  to  a  situation are
potentially enlivened or modified by that act. One learns as one interprets in an aesthetic
act, and this is one way, in the narrower zone of art, in which art is connected to life and
provides vitalizing and transcendent experience. More generally, the idea of perceptive
experience opens for me a view of human conduct and social life as primarily centered in
awareness rather than knowledge. 
53 Aesthetic experience is not to be confused with effete distance from everyday practice,
but  as  the  very  basis,  through  awareness  as  primary  modality  of  consciousness,  to
connect to the evolutionary roots of generalizing awareness through which we evolved
into  these  human  bodies.  Human  symboling  created  virtual  worlds  of  internalized
schemas of interpretation, but to live by them, through recognition, instead of with them,
through perception, would be a dangerous denial of engagement with the living habitat.
In my opinion, John, we evolved through perceptive awareness, what Ortega y Gasset
termed  “omnivorous  attention.”  Now,  it  seems  to  me,  we  have  installed  a  growing
technoculture that selects for living by recognition, in commodified unawareness. You
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would surely be surprised at how America has become a nation of button pushers, how
the world is pushing more and more buttons. This brings me to my next point. 
54 Your work, especially in The Public and Its Problems, renewed the tradition of the public as
a  valid  realm  of  conduct,  not  only  necessary  for  maintaining  vital,  flourishing
democracies, but also as a locus for everyday associative life. You brought into focus the
problem of the privatization of the idea of the common good, something that modern
thought seems to have lost because of its turning of subjectivity and emotions into what
philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre called “emotivism.”
55 Another aspect  of  the dilemma appeared in your contrast  of  Royce’s  idea of  a  Great
Community (his “translation” of Peirce’s idea of the unlimited community of inquirers
into a practical conception) to Graham Wallas’s conception of “the Great Society,” and
Walter Lippmann’s use of it. Lippmann took a technocratic approach that the public is not
real per se, but is only what he called The Phantom Public, managed by elites and mediating
media. Yet as you put it, “Till the Great Society is converted into a Great Community, the
Public will remain in eclipse. Communication can alone create a great community” (1927:
144). Again, democracy as a common life requires informed citizens capable of more than
being managed by elites. 
56 You also say, “Our concern at this time is to state how it is that the machine age in
developing  the  Great  Society  has  invaded  and  partially  disintegrated  the  small
communities of former times without generating a Great Community […] The local face-
to-face community has been invaded by forces so vast, so remote in initiation, so far-
reaching  in  scope  and  so  complexly  indirect  in  operation,  that  they  are,  from  the
standpoint of the members of the social units, unknown […] An inchoate public is capable
of organization only when indirect consequences are perceived, and when it is possible to
project agencies which order their occurrence” (1927: 126-7, 129). Your words of 1927
remain  even  truer  today,  when  vast  multinational  corporations  have  invaded  and
colonized the face-to-face community at every level. 
57 Marx’s  concerns  with  class  and  alienation  become  prominent:  what  would  a  class-
differentiated, yet unalienated Great Community look like? Can one even call America a
democracy  today  when  the  great  society  indicators  loom  ever  larger:  when  CEO  to
average worker salary ratios are 25 to 1, when average CEO pay (adjusted for inflation)
between 1990 and 2005 skyrocketed almost 300 percent, when in the twenty five years
from 1980 to 2005 more than 80 percent of total increase in Americans’ income went to
the  top  1  percent?  And  what  about  the  Republic  of  Fat  as  the  democratization  of
alienation: everyone dislodged from their bodies by being encased in them: The Great Big
Society!
58 In  America,  public  life  itself  has  been  transformed by  the  appearance  of  privatized
shopping malls,  which have  gutted local  commerce  in many towns  and cities,  while
diminishing or even eradicating the public space as a locus of community life. But the
private sphere has been colonized as well, moving way beyond the infusion of television
that had already just started in your lifetime. 
59 So much of  America today,  in its techno-depressive state,  wishes to be invulnerable,
liberated from the troublesome encounter with life that involves being vulnerable, being
live. Masking itself in technicalism, technical solutions and new technology, virtualized
home life through overuse of electronic devices, consumed Status Stuff, and an obesity
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epidemic, it has incarnated supersized perfections of anaesthesia: the mask of the living
dead. 
60 The ancient Greek polis, as Hannah Arendt pointed out, inherently involved the unique
perspectives each citizen brought to it, in contrast to “society,” a medieval mistranslation
of polis by Thomas Aquinas in Arendt’s view, which involves an aggregate. You saw this
earlier, in The Public and Its Problems,  when you said, “Associated or joint activity is a
condition of the creation of a community. But association itself is physical and organic,
while  communal  life  is  moral,  that  is,  emotionally,  intellectually,  and  consciously
sustained  […]  no  amount  of  aggregated  collective  action  by  itself  constitutes  a
community”  (1927:  151).  Aggregated  collective  action  by  itself  is  the  hallmark  of
consumptive Isolatoism today, armored against community. 
61 Contemporary  capitalist  democracy,  so-called,  emerged  triumphant  over  communist
democracy,  so-called,  at  the  end  of  the  twentieth-century.  As  the  joke  had  it,  the
difference  between  communism  and  capitalism  is  that  in  capitalism  it  is  man’s
inhumanity against man, but in communism it is completely the other way around. In the
garrison state that was totalitarianism the rats were punished by negative conditioning.
In “capitalist democracy” the rats are rewarded by positive conditioning. The latter has
apparently proven a more successful method of conditioning rats to become docile to
their  conditioning,  numb  to  their  loss  of  freedom  and  autonomy,  to  their  own
mechanization  and  dehumanization.  But  a  benumbed  population  of  conditioned  rats
tends eventually to gnaw its way to the garrison state. 
62 Democracy  in  your  sense  requires  autonomous  individuals  capable  of  living  for  the
common good, and a sense of the common good as capable of producing such individuals.
Varieties of authoritarian societies – including capitalist oligarchies – require individuals
and institutions subject to authoritarian good, yet not capable of determining it. They
tend to select for automata instead of autonomy. 
63 And yet democracy ends in a common good: the good life, as you strove to show. It is the
valuing of the common life over the special interests of an individual or institution. To
the extent that valuing is rooted in the practices of a common life it is a democratic life. 
64 You sought to put a human face on science and technology, so that they could serve as
instruments  for  the  reconstruction  of  society.  I  am sympathetic  to  recovering  these
powers, which seem to have run amok like the brooms released in The Sorcerers’ Apprentice
. But you seem to neglect, on the one side, Peirce’s valid claims that 1) science is primarily
a theoretical affair concerned with the long run toward truth which the scientist serves,
not the short term welfare of the scientist or society; and that 2) science does not go deep
enough, limited as it is to opinion and not belief, to serve the interests of practical life,
which require the availability of all the sentiments as well as practical judgment. On the
other side, your championing of a broadened conception of scientific inquiry as the basis
for democratic life still seems too narrow to encompass the necessary resources, even
though  your  model  remains  broader  and  more  humane  than  the  “communicative
rationality” machine constructed by Jürgen Habermas. You seem to leave so much out, or
rather,  to  think  that  it  can  be  squeezed  into  your  inquiry  model,  as  though  other
modalities  are  not  good  enough.  Where  does  that  “felt-sense”  that  leads  to  the
problematic situation in which inquiry begins, as you showed so well, fit in to this? Or is
there more?
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65 So how about throwing some tender-hearted words into the tender-minded mix as well?
Words like imaginative realism, or “the ART of political life,” or that reality of human
being which is far more developed than our vaunted rational intellect, though explicitly
targeted for destruction by the culture of narcissism that is  perfecting itself  globally
these days: empathy.
66 I find it odd that you showed so clearly the place of qualitative immediacy and aesthetic
experience in everyday life, yet give so little attention to how the sentiments, creative
vitalities,  and  capabilities  for  passionate  self-transcendence  bodying  forth  from vital
living  rather  than  a  perspective  of  critical  inquiry,  may  reanimate  the  wider
commonwealth that is our relation to ourselves, our families, neighbors, fellow citizens
and fellow human beings. You allow art a place, but it seems to me a very tepid place.
What is the place of simple face-to-face decency today, for example, or of trust and love? 
67 A contemporary politician and thinker named Vaclav Havel, the former president of the
Czech Republic who I like to think of as a “Prague-matist,” spoke of this elegantly at
Independence Hall,  Philadelphia,  on July  4,  1994,  where the American Declaration of
Independence  and  the  United  States  Constitution  were  originally  debated  on  and
adopted, when he said: “Yes, the only real hope of people today is probably a renewal of
our certainty that we are rooted in the earth and, at the same time, the cosmos. This
awareness  endows  us  with  the  capacity  for  self-transcendence.  Politicians  at
international forums may reiterate a thousand times that the basis of the new world
order must be universal respect for human rights, but it will mean nothing as long as this
imperative does not derive from the respect of the miracle of Being, the miracle of the
universe, the miracle of nature, the miracle of our own existence. Only someone who
submits to the authority of the universal order and of creation, who values the right to be
a part of it and a participant in it, can genuinely value himself and his neighbors, and ‐
thus honor their rights as well.”
68 Why is it, John, that Herman Melville, in his great novel Moby Dick, saw clearly in 1851
into the consequences of “Isolatoism,” of the global disaster the modern Ahabian mindset
would produce, the sinking of the world-ship in the mad quest for oil and “the phantom
of life” itself? How is it  that he also foresaw an alternative,  found in the renewal of
humble reconnection to the community of humankind and the earth, through Ishmael’s
connection to his shipmate Queequeg? 
69 My point  is  that  real  art  bodies  itself  forth,  whether  understood in  its  time or  not,
through means  other  than  inquiry.  Critical  thought  is  secondary  to  art.  So  perhaps
thinkers  fill  in  more  critically  what  artists  have  felt  expressively.  Peirce’s  theory  of
reality as intrinsically social  and involving a community of interpretation has always
seemed to me to develop logically what Melville expressed in Moby Dick: that Isolatoism is
unviable in the long run, that the modern “islander” consciousness must reconnect to
“the common continent” of humankind. So far so good. Only Melville, in my opinion, saw
more clearly and even earlier than Peirce why Isolato islander nominalism is not simply a
logical fallacy, but full suicide. And you seemed not to see this at all. 
70 Let  me  turn  this  to  another  context.  You  wanted  a  social  philosophy  that could
understand and reconstruct its times. But your understanding of the twentieth-century
more broadly, despite astute observations on a number of issues, seems kind of anemic to
me, tepid, and your writing is not lucid. I admire your transactional model of conduct,
how meaning should be understood in the “context of the situation,” but one of its great
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shortcomings manifested in your idea that  America should remain isolated from the
emerging conflict with totalitarian Nazi Germany. That is why I have to side with your
opponent, Lewis Mumford. 
71 The titles of the brief contributions in Common Sense, March 1939, on the theme of “If
War Comes–Shall We Participate or Remain Neutral?,” and on the eve of the war, say it
all.  Bertrand  Russell’s  is,  “The  Case  for  U.S.  Neutrality,”  yours  is,  “No  Matter  What
Happens–Stay Out,” and Mumford’s is “Fascism is Worse than War,” meaning war was the
lesser of two evils and that America should forcibly resist fascism. You stated: “If we but
made up our minds that it is not inevitable, and if we now set ourselves deliberately to
seeing that no matter what happens we stay out, we shall save this country from the
greatest social catastrophe that could overtake us, the destruction of all the foundations
upon which to erect a socialized democracy.”
72 The next few years proved Mumford right, and you and Russell wrong. You thought the
European conflict  was not the American “context of  situation,” neglecting the larger
civilizational context of situation. “No Matter what Happens” proved to be, as Mumford
said it would, that Hitler would do exactly what he said he would do in Mein Kampf and
would not be appeased under any circumstances. As Napoleon said, “Oh well, no matter
what happens, there’s always death.”
73 Mumford may not have possessed your technical philosophical knowledge, and he lacked
a sense of how significant class relations can be, but even so, his understanding of the
times was far deeper, and his writing far more elevated than yours. Like you Mumford
admired Emerson. But he embodies Emerson’s spirit far more than you. The essence of
that spirit to me is unfettered outpouring of ideas. But Mumford also drew from Melville,
and the other literary transcendentalists, and drew from darker intimations than you
were able to feel. You seem fossilized today in contrast to Mumford, as I read each of you,
yet you loom large because you were a pragmatist, and so have now been canonized by
the academic industry. Mumford fit no disciplinary boundaries neatly, and though widely
read in his time, has gone into partial eclipse. Perhaps as Emerson did for a time after his
death.
74 My question is: why were you so wrong – idiotically wrong in saying that war was not
inevitable yet deciding to stay out of it had to be – and why was Mumford so right?
Perhaps you were still feeling burned about your pro World War 1 stance and were on the
rebound. Still, I claim that Mumford was so right about that issue, and so much more
right about the dark forces released in the twentieth-century in general than your bright,
ardent outlook, because he allowed the full weight of his passions and emotions to inform
his thinking at a more full-bodied level. You may have built a philosophy that allowed for
a live social creature capable of experience – one deeper than many out there today, but
it didn’t amount to a row of beans when it came time for you to come to grips with the
mid-century madness, and still wouldn’t with the larger potential calamities primed to
release today. 
75 I am sorry I have to express such misgivings about the sustainability of your general
outlook, but, despite my continuing admiration for a number of the ideas you developed, I
simply needed to move on to more inclusive perspectives than your pragmatism could
provide.  Nonetheless,  you  remain  a  part  of  my  inner  community  of  thought,  which
includes a variety of perspectives I am grateful for being able to think with and draw
from.
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78 Dear Charles, 
79 I am a great fan of your philosophy, and felt that I need to write to you. The way you were
so neglected in your time, while your ideas winged forth and were bent by others to fit
the times, continues to appall me today. In the roughly hundred years since you died
there has been good news and bad news. The good news is that your works survived a
posthumous trip to the Harvard philosophy department hallways,  where they sat too
long,  and  even  though  some  papers  were  removed  and  others  taken  out  of  order,
collected works projects ensued and are still underway today. You are accepted as the
founder of pragmatism, as one of the founders of semiotic, and as a source of ideas still
being uncovered. It still is not widely known how you could be considered a key founder
of mathematical logic, though work by John Sowa has now detailed that.
80 But the bad news includes the fact that your semiotic was distorted into positivism by
Charles Morris, and that numerous theories going as semiotics, such as that of Ferdinand
de Saussure, are based on the very nominalism your semiotic realism sought to disprove.
Your ideas are still poorly misunderstood, but there appears to be growing interest in
them. 
81 You saw what they did to your pragmatism in your lifetime; fortunately you did not live
to see what they did to your semiotic. Charles Morris, who was a student (and not a very
good one) of John Dewey’s colleague and friend at Chicago, George Herbert Mead, was
ironically a major force in undermining pragmatism and semiotic in the name of the
glossy scientism of “logical empiricism.” That was a school of thought which stemmed
from Vienna, based largely in applied misunderstandings of a philosopher named Ludwig
Wittgenstein, who gave away his family fortune just as you were dying in dire poverty
around 1914. Too bad you two couldn’t have met up then: He could have traded you his
fortune for your mathematical  logic  and pragmaticism.  As it  happened,  a  friend and
colleague of his, Frank Ramsey, later introduced him to your thought and turned him
around in his work, though Wittgenstein didn’t acknowledge your influence explicitly.
82 And talk about the “kidnappers” who stole your pragmatism; it got even worse: Morris
used numerous terms from your semiotic without your name in his Foundations of a Theory
of Signs in 1938, and twisted the triadic ideas into dyadic positivism. He defines a sign as
having “three (or four)” factors, adding interpreter to his dyadic reductions of your first
three triadic sign terms: 
83 “This process, in a tradition which goes back to the Greeks, has commonly been regarded
as involving three (or four) factors: that which acts as a sign, that which the sign refers
to, and that effect on some interpreter in virtue of which the thing in question is a sign to
that interpreter. These three components in semiosis may be called respectively, the sign
vehicle, the designatum, and the interpretant; the interpreter may be included as a fourth
factor. These terms make explicit the factors left undesignated in the common statement
that a sign refers to something for someone” (Morris 1938: 3). Notice how he takes your
abbreviated definition of a sign as something which stands to someone in some respect or
capacity, says it is a “common statement,” conveniently bypassing your name, and then
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introduces different terminology from your threefold sign, object, interpretant, without
mentioning the switch. 
84 Morris did not understand that “the man himself,” as you put it, is a sign, not merely, as
he saw it, an interpreter considered as a “user” of signs not itself a sign. Here is a defense
of your theory against Morris’s misuse by one of your old students from John Hopkins
University, John Dewey, who you severely criticized in your letter of June 9, 1904 for
treating logic as a developmental or genetic history rather than as a normative science.
Forty years later Dewey had come to a better understanding of and appreciation for your
work: 
85 “The misrepresentation in question consists in converting Interpretant, as used by Peirce,
into a personal user or interpreter. To Peirce, ‘interpreter,’ if he used the word, would
mean, that which interprets, thereby giving meaning to a linguistic sign. I do not believe
that it is possible to exaggerate the scorn with which Peirce would treat the notion that
what interprets a given linguistic sign can be left to the whim or caprice of those who
happen  to  use  it.  But  it  does  not  follow  from  this  fact  that  Peirce  holds  that  the
interpretant,  that  which interprets  a  linguistic  sign,  is  an ‘object’  in the sense of  an
existential ‘thing’” (Dewey 1946: 87).
86 Dewey knew firsthand what your scorn might be, though, yes, you also praised him in
that  same  letter  to  him.  He  had  already  become  the  best  known  living  American
philosopher by the time he wrote those words in 1946, yet the positivism Morris helped
spearhead into American academic life had already begun its ascension, despite what you
and  the  other  pragmatists  had  shown  to  be  the  untenability  of  foundationalism  in
science. Foundationalism and its false promise of scientific certainty captured the minds
of those unable to appreciate the subtlety of your argument that all thoughts are signs, all
signs  are  inferences,  all  knowledge  consists  of  fallible  sign  inferences  conditionally
appealing to further interpretation. Positivist “verification” ruled the day, despite the
fact  that  you  showed  that  there  is  no  objective  meaning  in  an  act  of  positivist
“verification”  or  even in  a  scientific  experiment  per  se,  only,  perhaps,  some isolate
scientist indicating an individual thing.
87 Pragmatic meaning is found, as you put it, “not in an experiment, but in experimental
phenomena...,” not in “any particular event that did happen to somebody in the dead past,
but what surely will happen to everybody in the living future who shall fulfill  certain
conditions” (Peirce 1938:  5.425).  Hence there is  no meaning in a present moment or
immediate experimental result, but only in the living, mediate continuum of inferential,
general  semiosis.  Galileo’s  overturning  of  Aristotle’s  physics  was  a  great  triumph of
modern science, but Occam’s razor, as your critique of nominalism demonstrated, also cut
off generality as a reality of the universe, despite the fact that science only traffics in
signs and finds its objectivity in a conditional future community of interpretation, not in
individual “things.”
88 In a few decades after your death, when the so called 20th century “Anglo American”
philosophy had starved enough philosophers in America, the best alternative seemed to
be “Continental”  philosophy,  with its  phenomenology,  hermeneutics,  etc.  This  was  a
continental divide, a gulf of objectivism and subjectivism. But Charles, as you must know,
you had already undercut that  divide before it  even occurred,  in a philosophy more
rigorous  than  positivism,  more  comprehending  of  signification  than  the  Continental
tradition. I mean, you developed your phenomenology independently of Husserl (even
mentioning it in your 1904 letter to Dewey), calling it phaneroscopy so as not to confuse it
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with Hegel’s Phenomenology, and allowing the phaneron per se as its object. It is more
radical  than  Husserl’s  phenomenology  in  “bracketing  off”  Husserl’s  transcendental
subject in order to consider the phaneron itself. You also elaborated a comprehensive
semiotic  well  before  Saussure.  You  developed  a  rigorous  philosophy  of  science that
demonstrated why truth could not be found in a dyadic positivist reference, but only
through a thoroughly social conception of an unlimited community of inquirers. Truth is
a public matter, not a private positive “verification.”
89 I  don’t  mean to  sweet-talk  you,  but  in  my opinion,  your  demarcation of  a  “psycho-
physical universe,” of “a universe perfused with signs”; of the idea of a semiotic realism
in which the life of science resides, has yet to be comprehended as the great achievement
it is. It seems to me as significant as Einstein’s theory of relativity, which appeared in the
last years of your life but which you unfortunately were not aware of. But the world
cannot  yet  accept  the  reality  of  signs  as  an irreducible  mode of  being,  because  still
trapped in the modern error of nominalism. 
90 Enough praise! I know that you love criticism, and I have some for you. I also know that I
am likely to get my ass kicked in a debate with you, master philosopher of science as you
are. But that is how learning happens, isn’t it?
91 One thing that bothers me about your view of science is your unwillingness to allow that
the  very  nominalism you see  in  its  development  thus  far,  which you criticize  while
celebrating the achievements of modern science, might be so potentially destructive as to
open a final Pandora’s Box from which humankind, and the science so dear to you, might
never recover. I wonder why you never corresponded with Henry Adams, whose sense of
the  dangerous  increases  of  power  without  corresponding  human  controls  was  as
prescient as his methods were flawed. I think you could have really helped his thinking
on historical method, even as he could have sensitized you to how science, allied to power
technology, could undo itself if left without some sense of human limit. Around the time
of your letter to Dewey, and of Einstein’s publishing of his theory of relativity, Adams
wrote to Henry Osborne Taylor on Jan. 17, 1905: “The assumption of unity which was the
mark of human thoughts in the middle-ages has yielded very slowly to the proofs of
complexity.  The stupor of science before radium is a proof of it.  Yet it  is quite sure,
according to my score of ratios and curves, that, at the accelerated rate of progression
shown since 1600, it will not need another century or half century to tip thought upside
down. Law, in that case, would disappear as theory or a priori principle, and give place to
force.  Morality  would  become  police.  Explosives  would  reach  cosmic  violence.
Disintegration would overcome integration” (1947: 558-9).
92 Science and technology grew to the powers imagined by Adams, even as politics by mid-
century had realized total  police  states.  In  less  than a  half  century,  in  1945,  atomic
explosives reached cosmic violence,  and police states had broken out in the name of
morality. Henry Adams foresaw in 1905 what you did not, which is curious to me given
how farsighted you were in so many different areas of inquiry.
93 New  technical  powers  and  systems  emerged,  such  as  computing  machines,  vastly
elaborated beyond the electric one you attempted to build in the 1890s, which we have
not yet  figured out how to harness for human welfare.  Our society is  threatened by
depersonalization, our biosphere is threatened with vast extinctions, deforestations, and
climate change; toward all of which science and technology are no innocent bystanders.
To this, your maxim of “do not bar the road of inquiry,” as though science should be left
unfettered, bearing no responsibility to life while disemboweling it, seems to me, with all
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due respect, empty. I would not, of course, write in such underscored terms to any man
with whom I did not feel a very deep respect and sympathy, if I may paraphrase your own
words to Dewey. 
94 Yours sincerely, 
95 Gene Halton
 
Peirce letter 2: On semiotic
96 Dear Charles, 
97 I wanted to get back to you on Ferdinand de Saussure’s theory of signs, which came to
prominence in the twentieth century, and how it compares to your semiotic, and what
implications this might have for social science today. 
98 Saussure’s is a nominalist theory of signs in which actual conduct (speech or parole) is a
mere  instance,  meaningless  in  itself;  an  instance  of  deep  structure  (langue) wherein
meaning resides as convention, untouchable. An anthropology based on it would hold
that to be human is to be avatars of convention, whose live beings mean nothing more
than  the  conventions  they  represent.  Saussure’s  semiology  is  the  antithesis  of  the
Socratic  model  of  philosophy as  living speech,  or  of  your  view of  semiosis  as  living
conduct.  It  is  a  marked contrast  with your view of  semiosis  as  processual;  in  which
“structures” are habits, perhaps you would say congealed habits. Further, Saussure does
not  allow,  as  you do,  that  habits  of  conduct,  or  semiosis,  are  potentially  modifiable
through criticism and self-control. 
99 A lot of contemporary thought remains under the shadow Saussure’s semiology casts,
from figures such as Derrida, through Eco, and a number of others labeled postmodernist.
Lacan seems a Freudian Saussurean. A philosopher who did much to derail pragmatism,
by the name of Richard Rorty, was under the Saussurean shadow, not a pragmatist, in
seeing meaning nominalistically as either convention or contingency. Derrida, it seems to
me, sought to escape structuralist totality by swinging the Saussurean pendulum from
totalistic convention to “fissioning” of signs. 
100 Consider  the  irony  of  these  theories  of  meaning:  Saussure’s  structuralist  semiology
cannot account for emergence of new meaning, leaving it to poststructualists to try to
account  for  it  as  “contingency.”  It  is  a  structuralism  that  cannot  account  for  the
emergence of structure! 
101 What can one say anthropologically to those thinkers today who blankly believe that
human communication and representation exemplify a mode of being discontinuous with
earlier forms of communication and organization. Such a belief requires blindness to the
place  of  gestural  signification  in  human  language,  which  clearly  is  continuous  with
earlier,  prehuman  and  even  preprimate  communication.  George  Herbert  Mead’s
philosophy of signification provides such a continuous view from “the conversation of
gestures”  to  what  Mead  terms  “the  significant  symbol.”  But  believing  in  the  false
abstraction of structuralism requires a false belief of discontinuity. 
102 Many sociologists today still buy into the outlook of Durkheim and his use of the sacred in
social life to account for symbolization: Durkheim is another structuralist limited to a
conceptualist  view of  representation,  holding what  I  elsewhere  term a  “bubble  boy”
theory of meaning, unable to touch the world.  When one goes to the beliefs held by
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hunter-gatherer peoples, such as the Australian aboriginals Durkheim discussed, one sees
that, contra Durkheim, they hold mind to be continuous with the living landscape, not
some discontinuous product of a structuralist mind cage. So does your semiotic, which
allows the object of a sign to be part of the sign, including the actual objects of habitat.
Your semiotic allows that human mind emerges in transaction with the living intelligence
of habitat, that indeed, it is an adaptation to that habitat and of mind in general. Your
critical common-sensism allows that evolved, tempered habits of mind percolate from
deep  within  the  human  body-mind,  providing  us  with,  if  I  may  express  it  tersely,
indubitable yet fallible ideas for the practice of life. 
103 The Scottish common-sensists’ idea of “original and natural judgments of common sense”
also raises the question of inborn ideas. What if there are such, so deeply engrained as to
be indubitable? The typical response today is to say that ideas are social,  and that a
naturally given idea could not be social, so that inborn ideas are not possible. But this
seems to me to falsely assume that human biology is not itself social. The physiological
capacity for speech stems from genetically encoded, developmentally released biological
capacities that are themselves the result of prior social  experience and selection, yet
requiring social interaction for their release and cultivation. 
104 Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s popular theory of “habitus” cannot handle the possibility of
biologically engrained habits, because his conception of habit is too conceptual. Between
the habits of conduct and the situation is the living and spontaneous “I.” Habit is not
limited to dead convention,  as it  is in Bourdieu,  and habit change can be more than
contingency, which is where a number of postmodernists unnecessarily limit themselves.
It  makes  me  wonder  why  Bourdieu’s  overly  conceptualized  conception  of  habit  has
become so fashionable in the social sciences, given the vast role, more richly conceived,
that  habit  has  played in Anglo-American philosophy in the past  few hundred years?
Pragmatism  alone  makes  it  central,  and  more  deeply  thought  out  than  Bourdieu’s
conception, allowing the possibilities of living habit and self-correcting habits of conduct.
But Bourdieu applies his idea fruitfully to interesting studies of status as social capital, so
perhaps a more generous route might be to consider what a pragmatic conceptualization
of habit  could add to typical  phenomena that Bourdieu considers.  Actually Thorstein
Veblen,  who you  might  remember  from your  time  at  johns  Hopkins  University,  did
something like that decades before Bourdieu.
105 Still, Bourdieu cannot, in the end, deal with something like aesthetic taste as anything
more than habitualized social conventions. He works that vein to great effect, and it’s a
rich  vein,  but  to  see  taste  as  only  rote  conventions  is  to  my mind ultimately,  well,
tasteless. What about taste in the literal sense of con gusto, as sensual experience? What
about the whole realm of qualitative experience and signification you and Dewey showed
to be an irreducible modality of signification?
106 You, with some humor, designated humankind as a “degenerate monkey,” acknowledging
the evolutionary significance of human neoteny. I think that idea can be put to good use
in  considering  the  long  evolutionary  path  to  anatomically  modern  humans  and  the
significance  of  that  evolution  for  society  today.  But  it  needs  to  be  joined  to  other
conceptions not considered by you. 
107 The  “original  exchange”  is  not  mere  human  concepts  of  “sacred”  anthropocentric
“structure,” but what Paul Shepard termed “the sacred game,” the interplay of predator
and prey,  and the literal  and spiritual  incorporation of  the wild  Other  (a  game is  a
process,  a sign process in the sense of your semiotic).  The sacred game is where the
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human mind emerged, a game so subtle it required all the abilities it summoned forth
from its human players, even as it fed them with those emerging abilities and helped
them to evolve and incarnate them, including… perhaps you would agree?… language. 
108 With regards, 
109 Gene Halton
 
To Charles Peirce, final letter
110 Dear Charles,
111 Part of your outlook is that rationality is the most evolutionarily immature of our brain
capacities,  requiring  connection  in  life  to  other,  more  mature  capacities  such  as
sentiment  and instinct  from the  older  passionate  brain  centers,  in  order  to  operate
optimally.  Hence,  as  I  understand  you,  rational  science,  which  you  champion,  is
inadequate as a guide to practical life, because it does not draw deeply enough from the
bodily resources available to practical reason. This I get. Indeed, so much of the morass of
modernity is due precisely to the outlook which takes rational reason as defining what
reason is, and the unlimited expansion of rational reason as progress and enlightenment,
rather than a form of infantilization. Unhinged expansion of rationality results in rational
madness. Yet rationality limited, conceived as a not fully matured capacity requiring its
synaptic  tethering  to  the  larger  community  of  passions  both  constituting  brain  and
incarnating  the  broader  community  of  organic  reasonableness,  results  in  optimized
rational  capacity  for  the  practice  of  life.  Rationality  optimized  is  not  maximized
rationality.
112 But then consider the possibility that “the degenerate monkey” that you characterized
humanity as being is even further infantilized in its form as scientist. You saw, rightly as I
understand you,  why science is too thin to be practical,  why it  must be limited as a
theoretical pursuit. But you did not see how scientists, qua scientists, may for the same
reason be subhumans, limited in their precision to what the nominalized goals of our age
sets for them. As such they become dangerous when they rise to prominent positions to
advocate science policies for practical life,  speaking from their scientific (and by you
limited) perspective, and from a nominalistic conception of science at that. They begin
making nuclear bombs and altering the very genetic basis of life itself, often in the service
of governments or corporations who care only about power and profit. Not that the other
extreme,  politicians ignorant  of  science,  are any better.  This  is  the issue Dewey was
wrestling  with,  in  trying  to  find  a  way  for  a  conception  of  inquiry  as  a  basis  for
democratic  life.  His  answer  was  unsatisfying  to  me,  because  he  did  not  allow  that
scientific inquiry per se may be too narrow a model. But at least he was concerned with
the problem, which you seem to have glossed over.
113 Dewey was trying to argue against authoritarian models of society. But his quest for a
democratic good life rooted in the idea of scientific inquiry amounted to an unwitting
blueprint for technocracy, rule by elite technocratic authorities, where your view allows
that life is broader than science, and that science should be restricted in its place in
society. Your critical common-sensism seems to me a way that allows intelligent inquiry a
place  in  practical  life,  but  bases  it  in  the  more  mature  passions  of  reasonableness,
acknowledging that those passions evolved and adapted over a longer stretch of time, and
hence embody matured capacities of impassioned reasonableness. Still, your indifference
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to the dangers of actually existing science, even in your day but particularly now, remains
problematic.  You  assumed  the  scientific  method  would  eventually  work  out  false
assumptions of nominalism, but in my view, neglected how those assumptions could be
suicidally toxic, to the point of aborting a human “long run.”
114 Stricter safeguards on new technologies seem to me a moral necessity where relevant,
and today, scientific inquiry cannot be strictly separated from its conjoined schizoid twin,
technology. Together they are destroying the earth, the social fabric, and us. That’s the
gap I don’t see you addressing.
115 In Aldous Huxley’s 1932 novel Brave new World, a controller of a technologically advanced
society hundreds of years in the future, based on the principles of mass production Henry
Ford was developing in your last years of life, expresses exactly the expedient perversion
of inquiry to serve practical concerns that you were fearful of:
116 “I’m interested in truth, I like science. But truth’s a menace, science is a public danger. As
dangerous as it’s been beneficent.  It  has given us the stablest equilibrium in history.
China’s was hopelessly insecure by comparison; even the primitive matriarchies weren’t
steadier than we are. Thanks, I repeat, to science. But we can’t allow science to undo its
own good work. That’s why we so carefully limit the scope of its researches – that’s why I
almost got sent to an island. We don’t allow it to deal with any but the most immediate
problems of  the  moment.  All  other  enquiries  are  most  sedulously  discouraged.  It’s
curious,” he went on after a little pause, “to read what people in the time of Our Ford
used to write about scientific progress. They seemed to have imagined that it could be
allowed to go on indefinitely, regardless of everything else. Knowledge was the highest
good, truth the supreme value; all the rest was secondary and subordinate. True, ideas
were beginning to change even then.  Our Ford himself  did a  great  deal  to  shift  the
emphasis from truth and beauty to comfort and happiness. Mass production demanded
the shift. Universal happiness keeps the wheels steadily turning; truth and beauty can’t.
And, of course, whenever the masses seized political power, then it was happiness rather
than truth and beauty that mattered. Still, in spite of everything, unrestricted scientific
research was  still  permitted.  People  still  went  on talking about  truth and beauty  as
though they were the sovereign goods. Right up to the time of the Nine Years’ War. That
made them change their tune all right. What’s the point of truth or beauty or knowledge
when the anthrax bombs are popping all around you? That was when science first began
to be  controlled –  after  the Nine Years’  War.  People  were ready to  have even their
appetites controlled then. Anything for a quiet life. We’ve gone on controlling ever since.
It hasn’t been very good for truth, of course. But it’s been very good for happiness. One
can’t have something for nothing. Happiness has got to be paid for. You’re paying for it,
Mr. Watson – paying because you happen to be too much interested in beauty. I was too
much interested in truth. I paid too.”
117 Comfort and happiness: who would want to fight that? Yet these words give lie to the cost
they bring when elevated to ultimate goals of life. Life in earnest, life for real, cannot be
reduced to comfort as a basis for happiness. Ultimate happiness, even in practical life,
must  be  more  than  comfort.  It  must  involve  creative  participation  in  the  greater
community of life, engaging it, living to sustain it. And science, though narrower, lives to
sustain the bringing into being of truth, regardless of happiness. As you showed so well,
science, as a human practice, serves general truths greater than human comfort, and
should be regarded as the valuable yet impractical practice it is: it should be kept in its
place,  limited.  When  turned  to  considerations  of  comfort,  science  becomes  a  loose
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cannon, subject to passing fashions and bureaucratic control. That is the grave problem
we now face.
118 New technologies and devices and even life-forms now bubble forth from labs in ever
greater profusion. The question is whether such safeguards are “blocking the road of
inquiry” or what I will call “building the road of inquiry.” It just seems to me infantile to
open Pandora’s box scientifically, but to treat the consequences of that scientific opening
of the door as not themselves part of the pragmatic meaning of “scientifically opening
the door.”
119 Unfettered  exploration,  under  the  eye  of  public  scrutiny,  is  perhaps  like  Gandhi’s
response to the question, “Mr. Gandhi, What do you think of Western civilization?” He
said “I think it would be a very good idea.” Consider how the foundations of Big Science
today are rooted in the legacy of the Manhattan Project, which gathered the greatest
minds for an amazing project which had all the essential characteristics of science except 
public  scrutiny.  Consider  massive  funding  by  the  Pentagon  for  projects  such  as  the
internet, or massive funding of research by private corporations who maintain privacy
for commercial purposes, even patenting the genetic blueprints of life for private gain.
Public scrutiny is too easily shunted aside,  and today,  I  fear,  we may be cooking the
“primordial  soup”  of  the  Apocalypse  in  commercial  ventures  involving  genetic
recombination, including the unintended ones wafting from toxic manure lagoons of the
unfettered agricultural complex. The recent pandemic of 2009 originated in La Gloria,
Mexico, where a giant high-tech Smithfield pig slaughtering plant operates unfettered,
with huge toxic manure lagoons blending pig,  human, and,  from a nearby industrial
poultry operation, avian DNA: Recombinant Roulette! 
120 No thought is given to how to close Pandora’s Box before opening and patenting it, or
such thoughts are repressed from public hearing by money and power interests. J. Robert
Oppenheimer, director of the Manhattan Project, which developed the first atomic bombs
used as weapons against Japan, said: “In some sort of crude sense which no vulgarity, no
humor, no overstatement can quite extinguish, the physicists have known sin; and this is
a  knowledge  which  they  cannot  lose.”  Oppenheimer  was  later  betrayed  by  fellow
physicist  Edward  Teller,  who  lied  that  Oppenheimer  was  a  security  risk,  and
Oppenheimer  was  blackballed.  Science-fused-to-tech  has  become  Krishna,  avatar  of
Vishnu, manifesting unfettered to Arjuna, multi-armed and saying, as Oppenheimer put
it: “Now I am become death, the destroyer of worlds.” So where do you stand in today’s
world, Charles, where nominalism is perfecting itself through the avatars of its scientific-
industrial complex, not, as it has claimed, in a non-teleological manner, but instead allied
to an ultimate goal of dehumanization? Modern nominalistic science you see, or at least
as  I  am claiming,  is  avatar  of  a  mythic  projection  of  the  machine,  of  a  clockworks
symbolism of automatism, onto the cosmos. And it seems bent on strangling itself before
correcting itself.
121 OK, I came across a variant of your “do not bar the road of inquiry” maxim I can live with,
from your letter of 1905 to Dewey: “Never permanently bar the road of any true inquiry”
(CP 8.243).  By introducing “permanently,” it  seems to me to allow for questioning of
potential harmful effects of some inquiries, and the barring of them when needed until
adequate safeguards can be established.
122 Charles, you are the vox clamantis in deserto of modern thought. Your devotion to science
and logic led you to develop a philosophy with more rigor than any other accounts of
modern science, in my opinion. It also led you to reject the nominalistic foundations of
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modern  thought,  including  modern  scientific  thought,  and  to  replace  them  with  a
broadened understanding of reason. 
123 Your 1893 essay “Evolutionary Love” was anthologized and read, but for many it served to
illustrate your ideas as out of touch with accepted evolutionary principles of  natural
selection. Of course your point was precisely to criticize natural selection as a precise but
partial aspect of evolution, which, when taken as the totality of evolution, amounted to a
false “philosophy of greed.” Instead you saw it  as corresponding to your category of
firstness,  as  a  doctrine of  chance or what  you termed tychism.  You added two other
modalities,  corresponding to  your  three  modes  of  being:  evolution by secondness  or
mechanical necessity, which you termed anancasm, and evolution by thirdness or habit
taking or evolutionary love, which you termed agapasm. The typical response to these
two other categories was that they do not fit the natural selection model. 
124 But then the second modality of necessity you described, using Clarence King’s idea of
catastrophic events causing sudden shifts in populations, seems to receive support by the
idea of “punctuated equilibria,” though no credit was given to you. Similarly, your use of
Lamarckian-like inheritance through habit seems now justified by the discovery of the
epigenome,  which  encodes  an  organism’s  experience  onto  the  heritable  DNA.  But
biologists still refuse to consider natural selection per se as incomplete, as one modality
involved with others. 
125 As one degenerate monkey to another, I just want to let you know I find your ideas on
evolution, on semiotic realism as allowing mind in nature and brain as in mind rather
than  the  reverse,  to  hold  many  suggestive  possibilities  for  further  lines  of  inquiry,
especially, for me, on the larger perspective of human development. Your devotion to
your work despite the punishing indifference of the world seems to me well worth your
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1. References to the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (8 vols., Harvard University Press,
1931-58) are given in volume and paragraph: for example, CP 8.265 is volume 8 paragraph 265.
References  to  The  Essential  Peirce  (2  vols.,  Indiana  University  Press,  1992,  1998)  are  given  in
volume and page numbers: for example, EP2: 2 is vol. 2, p. 2. References to Peirce’s manuscripts
follow the Robin Catalogue of the Peirce Papers in the Houghton Library at Harvard University (
Annotated Catalogue of the Papers of Charles S. Peirce, University of Massachusetts Press, 1967).
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ABSTRACTS
If pragmatists conceive of thought as an internal dialogue, then why not externalize that thought
as  a  dialogue  in  the  form of  letters  to  the  major  pragmatists  concerning  their  ideas  in  the
contemporary world.  This piece consists of  letters fired off  to William James,  Charles Peirce,
George Herbert Mead, and John Dewey, concerning key ideas from each and how these ideas
relate to contemporary social thought. 
Queries are posed concerning what modifications of pragmatists’ ideas might be needed today,
how,  for  example,  Charles  Peirce’s  semiotic  became  known  through  the  systematic
misinterpretations of Charles Morris, how Peirce’s view of science as disconnected from practical
life and Dewey’s view of society as requiring a model of inquiry derived from science might be
reframed today, in the age of scientism; how William James’s critique of science as unnecessarily
excluding  “the  personality  as  a  condition  of  events”  might  be  reconciled  with  Peirce  and
contemporary  outlooks;  how  Dewey’s  aesthetic  theory  and  public  philosophy  address
contemporary  issues;  how  George  Herbert Mead’s  idea  of  the  generalized  other  might  be
critically refined in a time when what I term “the mechanical other” seems predominant, and
what the evolutionary origins of the generalized other might be. 
The form of the letter not only provides a way to illustrate the dialogical nature of thought, but
also to highlight how pragmatist ideas continue in dialogue with contemporary life, and to do so
with panache: not simply epistles, but e-pistols.
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